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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 870294

v.
STANLEY E. GOTSCHALL,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a jury conviction of Second Degree
Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-203 (1978), the Honorable David E. Roth, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the lower court err in refusing to dismiss a

prospective juror for cause who initially expressed
misunderstanding of the burden of proof but who later agreed to
apply the appropriate standard?
2.

Did the lower court properly admit evidence of

defendant's prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence as evidence of defendant's motive, intent, and
knowledge?
3.

Did defendant fail to properly cite to the record

to support his factual allegations that evidence of the victim's
character was improperly admitted and misrepresent the facts,
thus precluding a proper review of this argument?

4.

Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the

jury on negligent homicide as a lesser included offense under the
facts of this case?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.
Rule 47(f)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 404(a) & (b) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-206(1) (Repl. Vol. 8B,
1975 ch.);
Utah Code Ann. S
1978 ch.).

76-2-103(4) (Repl. Vol. 8B,

The text of these statutes and rules is set forth in
the corresponding argument portion sof this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Stanley E. Gotschall ("Pete"), was charged
with second degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978).

A jury found defendant guilty

of second degree murder on August 4, 1987. He was sentenced on
August 4, 1987 to serve a term of not less than five years and
which may be for life at the Utah State Prison.

The Notice of

Appeal was filed on August 20, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 17, 1987 at approximately 2:00 a.m., defendant,
Stanley HPeteH Gotschall struck Don Miller multiple times with
the thick end of a pool cue at the Horseshoe Lounge and Showroom,
killing him (R. 231-33; 274-75).

The obvious death blow was to

the base of the skull, probably severing the vertebral artery and
causing massive subarachnoid hemorrhage (R. 229-31).
-2-

Another

blow to the back of and behind the right ear caused a skull
fracture (R. 234-35).

Eyewitnesses agree that all but one blow

was struck after the victim was motionless on the floor (R. 275,
312).
Stanley "Pete" Gotschall was tried before a jury on
July 30, 1987, and was convicted of second degree murder, a first
degree felony, on August 4, 1987 (R. 81). Defendant appealed his
conviction on August 13, 1987 (R. 98). Background facts
pertinent to the issues on appeal are as follows:
On May 16, 1987, Sandra Donaldson and others entered
the Round-Up Bar and Cafe before leaving to fish (R. 274). She
had seen defendant previously in this establishment and
understood that he managed the cafe (R. 405-06).

At about 3:00

p.m. defendant approached Mrs. Donaldson and told her "that [she]
was so ugly he would be doing [her] a favor if he bashed [her]
head in with his attitude adjustor" (R. 406-07).

Mrs. Donaldson

further testified that she was aware that defendant called the
baseball bat that he was swinging at the time, his "attitude
adjustor" (R. 408).
Later that same evening, defendant again entered the
Round-Up and spoke to Veda Hadden, the bartender (R. 411). In
this conversation, defendant remarked that he would have liked to
bash in the head of a previous bartender with a baseball bat (R.
412).

Ms. Hadden further testified that defendant left the

Round-Up at 1:35 a.m., approximately one half hour before the
victim's death (R. 413).
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Debra L. Adams, who was with defendant at the Round-Up
Lounge, testified that they went to the Horseshoe Lounge around
1:30 a.m. (R. 257). The victim, Don Miller, arrived shortly
thereafter (R. 257). Although Mr. Miller arrived with a girl,
she left with another patron (R. 258). At this point, defendant,
Ms. Adams, Mr. Miller, Robin Bancroft, and Ray Loos were seated
at the bar (R. 259).
Robin Bancroft tipped over her beer, and used a bar
towel to wipe up the mess (R. 337). When she attempted to throw
the bar towel back to the bartender, she missed and hit Debra
Adams (R. 338). Debra testified that Robin apologized (R. 261).
However, defendant walked up behind Ray and hit him (R. 261).
When Ray turned around to confront his attacker, Don Miller
intervened (R. 262). Mr. Miller told defendant to "mellow out"
(R. 262). Following this incident defendant ceased his attack,
Mr. Miller returned to his seat at the bar, and Mr. Loos and Mr.
Bancroft left the Lounge (R. 342-43).
The bartender followed Loos and Bancroft to the door
and locked it because it was approximately 2:00 a.m., closing
time (R. 263). The bartender, Laurie Child, returned to the bar,
and Mr. Miller asked for another beer (R. 374). When Ms. Child
refused his request because it was past closing time; Mr. Miller
knocked his empty beer bottle off of the bar (R. 374). Ms. Child
again refused to give him another beer and replaced the empty
bottle, which Mr. Miller again knocked off the bar (R. 374). Ms.
Child testified that this argument was not an angry dispute, and
that she and Mr. Miller were good friends (R. 375).

After Mr. Miller knocked the bottle on the floor for
the second time, defendant approached him and started screaming
that it was his bar and Mr. Miller was not to behave that way (R.
266).

Defendant began threatening Mr. Miller with bodily harm,

while Mr. Miller encouraged defendant to "mellow out" (R. 267).
It then appeared that defendant was heading out the door; but
before he exited, he stopped and came back into the bar toward
Mr. Miller (R. 270). Defendant picked up a pool stick and
started swinging it (R. 273). Defendant hit Mr. Miller, who had
his back turned to defendant, on the head (R. 273). Mr. Miller
fell to the floor and defendant continued hitting him (R. 275).
shortly thereafter another patron left to call the police (R.
278).
The police arrested defendant approximately one hour
later (R. 529). After reading defendant his Miranda warnings,
Officer Sandberg took a statement which was admitted as State's
Exhibit 11 (R. 248). In this statement, which was read to the
jury upon defendant's request, defendant claimed that he hit Mr.
Miller in self-defense (R. 489).
During the selection of the jury, Mr. Hundel, a
prospective juror, made statements which evidenced his lack of
understanding of the concepts of burden of proof and defendant's
right not to testify (R. 149-52).

Defendant moved that Hundel be

dismissed for cause (R. 154). After further questioning of Mr.
Hundel, the Court denied defendant's challenge for cause (R.
155).

However, Mr. Hundel did not sit as a member of the jury

because he was dismissed by one of defendant's peremptory
challenges (R. 155-56).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court did not err in refusing to dismiss a
prospective juror for cause and requiring defendant to exercise a
peremptory challenge in order to excuse the venireman.

The court

also properly allowed evidence of prior bad acts to show
defendant's motive, intent, and knowledge under Utah Rules of
Evidence 404(b).
Defendant's failure to properly cite to the record and
to explain the facets of his legal argument supporting his claim
that evidence of the victim's character was improperly admitted
render this point largely unreviewable.

In attempting to resolve

the ambiguity of this point, the State submits that evidence of
character was not improperly admitted.
The Court properly refused to include instructions of
negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of second degree
murder according to the facts of this case, as viewed most
favorably for the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO DISMISS A PROSPECTIVE
JUROR FOR CAUSE.
Defendant claims that it was prejudicial error for the
court to refuse to dismiss a prospective juror, Mr. Hundel, for
cause; thus requiring defendant to exercise one of his peremptory
challenges in order to excuse the venireman.

Specifically,

defendant contends that Mr. Hundel failed to grasp the principle
that an accused does not have an affirmative burden to prove his

innocence, and that a defendant need not testify unless he
chooses to do so.

(Defendant's brief, at 9).

The court

properly denied defendant's challenge for cause and defendant's
subsequent use of his peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Hundel
did not result in prejudicial error.
Rule 47(f)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states that a prospective juror should be dismissed for cause
when it becomes evident:
That a state of mind exists on the part of
the juror with reference to the cause, or to
either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the party
challenging.
This Court has stated, on the other hand, that only those jurors
who hold "strong and deep impressions" demonstrating a closed
mind and an unwillingness to apply the law should be excused for
cause.

State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984).

In this

case, the prospective juror did not demonstrate such a
disposition.
Initially, the concepts of burden of proof and of a
defendant's constitutional right not to testify are legal
doctrines that are occasionally difficult for the layman to grasp
without an explanation of the practical application.

The record

shows that Mr. Hundel did not understand these concepts when
defense counsel began her questioning.
clarified these concepts.

Sensing this, Judge Roth

The dialogue in question commenced as

follows:
Ms. Gorman:

I only have a few questions
also. Could all of you keep an
open mind until all the evidence

is in? Could all of you do
that? Or would you be making up
your mind halfway through after
the State was done?
Okay. Do any of you have a
problem with the fact that as
Mr. Gotschall sits here today he
is innocent? Do any of you have
a problem with the fact because
a person is charged with a
crime, you have the propensity
to think he probably did it?
Anybody think that?
Any of you disagree with the
fact that because he is here
charged, he is anything else
than innocent? Do you have any
problems with that?
And just one last question.
Would you, after hearing the
State's side of the evidence—I
guess I should explain, the
prosecution will go first. They
bring on their side. And then
after that, it is the defendant
could present evidence. Would
any of you have a problem if,
after the State offered their
evidence, would you expect the
defendant to offer his?
What would any of you think
if the defendant didn't offer
any evidence? Would you want to
hear his version? Okay, What
if he didn't offer a version,
would you hold the State to
their burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt? Could you do
that without hearing the
defendant's version of the
facts?
Mr. Hundel:
The Court:

I think it would be difficult to
decide.
The questions are coming in a
form I am not sure the Jury can
respond to appropriately. If you
will permit me to Instruct the
Jurors that it is always the
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burden on the State to prove the
guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt. If they can do
that. The defendant has no
obligation to present a defense.
He has no obligation to testify
if he doesn't want to. And you
would be instructed that you are
not to hold that against him.
And you must still judge the
State's case on its own merits.
And unless the State has proven
him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, you will find the
defendant not guilty. If any of
you quarrel with that law—
Gorman:

Mr. Hundel, you indicated you
might have a problem. What
would that be?

Hundel:

I was just stating a fact. The
State presents their case, and
the defendant has no case at
all. I don't know, it wouldn't
seem like, you know, a fair
trial. Naturally the man wants
to defend his innocence if he is
innocent.

Gorman:

Do you think a man has to defend
his innocence, or the State has
to prove he is guilty?

Hundel:

Somebody has to do something.
mean it can't be in limbo.

Gorman:

Can't be what?

Hundel:

Can't be in limbo. The State
has to present a case enough to
prosecute, or the defendant has
to present a case enough to make
him look innocent. I mean it
can't be like hanging in midair. Somebody has got to do
something. You know what I
mean?

Gorman:

How about after you heard the
States' evidence, and you
weren't—you have some questions
about a couple of elements.
What would your verdict be?

I

Mr. Daines:
The Court:

Your Honor, I object to asking
for the verdict.
I am not sure that's an
appropriate question.

Mr. Hundel:

I couldn't answer the question.

The Court:

If you heard the State's evidence
and were not convinced of the
defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and even though
the defendant presented no
defense would you be able to find
him not guilty?

Mr. Hundel:
(R. 449-52).

I don't know. I don't know.
would have to—I don't know.

I

Based on the foregoing, defendant contends that Mr.

Hundel refused to apply the burden of proof to the State and that
he should have been dismissed for cause.

However, the record

merely evidences understandable confusion about this concept.
Defendant points out that at one point Mr. Hundel
stated that "the defendant has to present a case enough to make
him look innocent."

(R. 152; Defendant's brief at 9.)

However,

this response was made to an inartful compound question which
asked "Do you think a man has to defend his innocence, or the
State has to prove he is guilty?"

(R. 152.)

A review of the

entire record surrounding this discussion, and encompassing the
statement in question, reveals that the prospective juror simply
felt that some procedure must be taken to further the case—his
confusion was simply as to whether it should be the State or
defendant who needed to move forward.
The State does not assert that Mr. Hundel came into the
courtroom with a complete understanding of the concept.
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However,

upon further questioning, his misunderstanding of the law and his
willingness to comply with the judge's instructions is evident:
The Court:

Mr. Hundel:
The Court:

Mr. Hundel, I don't want to leave
any loose ends with how you feel
about this. Let me walk through
the process and see if we have a
misunderstanding. You do
understand it is the State's
burden to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
Yes, I do.
Do you have any problem with
that?

Mr. Hundel: No,
The Court:

Mr. Hundel:
The Court:

If the State does not prove the
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
would you be able to find the
defendant not guilty? If the
State doesn't prove the case.
Well, the defendant has to prove
himself innocent before I would.
He doesn't have to. The law
doesn't require that.

Mr. Hundel

The law doesn't require that?

The Court:

The burden is on the State
throughout the trial to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
Do you accept that?

Mr. Hundel:

Yeah.

The Court:

Would you require the defendant
to present a defense even though
the State had not proved guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt in your
mind?

Mr. Hundel

Not if he don't have to, I guess
I wouldn't require it.

(R. 152-53).
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During this questioning, it became apparent that the
prospective juror did misunderstand the law when he stated that
"the defendant has to prove himself innocent" (R. 152). However,
the court quickly corrected this misconception and then
requestioned Mr. Hundel to ascertain whether he understood the
burden of proof principle and would not require defendant to
offer evidence to support his innocence.

Once educated on the

meaning of the concept of innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, Mr. Hundel agreed to apply the concept to
defendant.
Even if this juror should have been excused, the issue
of prejudice remains.

This Court has previously held that is

reversible error to force a defendant to use a peremptory
challenge to eliminate a juror that should have been excused for
cause.

State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987), and cases

cited therein.

Recently, however, in Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S.

Ct. 2273 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that "where
juror who should have been excused for cause was removed by
defendant's peremptory challenge, any claim that the jury was not
impartial was required to focus, not on the excused juror, but on
the jurors who ultimately sat."

The Court reasoned that as long

as the jury which actually sat for the case was impartial, it is
unimportant that defendant was forced to use a peremptory
challenge to excuse a potentially biased juror.

Should this

Court determine that Mr. Hundel should have been excused for
cause, the State requests this Court to reevaluate its previous
decisions in light of Ross.

Defendant in this case has not

claimed that jurors who actually sat on his case were anything
but fair and impartial.

While he may have wished, for strategy

reasons, to eliminate a juror other than Mr. Hundel, unless a
juror who sat prejudiced him by acting unfairly or partially,
there should be no reversible error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS UNDER RULE 404(b) of
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTIVE, INTENT, AND KNOWLEDGE.
State v. Pacheo, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985), this Court
held that:
Evidence of prior crimes is admissible if the
evidence is relevant to prove a specific
element of the crime for which a defendant is
on trial. The evidence is not admissible if
it is relevant solely to show a defendant's
propensity to commit a crime.
712 at 185.

See also State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah

1985); State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982).
In this case, during a preliminary conference, Judge
Roth considered the question of admissibility of statements made
by defendant the evening before the alleged incident (R. 161).
Although counsel for defendant strenuously objected, Judge Roth
determined that the evidence proposed by the State would show
modus operandi, and was thus admissible (R. 162). The Court
further stated:
I really don't think it is a close question
personally under these circumstances. We are
talking about the evening prior to a homicide
where a person is saying he has this
propensity and this history of using clubs on
people [sic] head. And the same night he
uses a club or pool stick on somebody's head.
I think it is evidence as to his state of

mind leading up to the crime. Evidence
bearing on his intent at the time, lack of
mistake, motive. It fits. It is
prejudicial, sure it is. I think the
relevance outweighs the prejudicial effect
(R. 163)
Had the testimony of witnesses Sandra Donaldson and
Veda Hadden been used simply to disgrace defendant and to
establish a tendency or propensity toward criminal acts, it would
have severely prejudiced defendant.

However, in accordance with

the court's favorable ruling the evidence questioned was properly
admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which
states:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Sandra Donaldson testified that she saw defendant less than
twelve hours before the death of the victim in this case.
questioning, the following dialogue took place:
Q:

Where were you when you were approached?

A:

I was coming up the stairs from the
restaurant into the bar.

Q:

And what, if anything, did the defendant
say to you?

A:

He told me that I was so ugly he would be
doing me a favor if he bashed my head in
with his attitude adjuster.

Q:

Did he have anything in his hands at that
time?

Upon

A:

He had a wooden baseball bat in his
hands.

Q:

Does this appear to be the bat, Ms.
Gorman—or you were referring to?

A:

It looks like it.

Q:

At least sizewise this is what it was?

A:

It looked bigger when he was swinging it,
but I am sure that's it.

Q:

Did he call it an attitude adjustor?

A:

Yes, he did.

(R. 407-08).
Another witness, Veda Hadden, testified that she also
had a conversation with defendant several hours later, but still
before the victim's death.

During questioning, Ms. Hadden

reported:
A:

Well, he [defendant] had told me that he
was mad at the bartender previous, okay,
another bartender that worked there.
And, okay, he had had a conflict with
this man. And the night this conflict
happened, I took the other guy home,
okay, to get him away from Pete and from
the police that were there.

Q:

But what, if anything, did Pete say at
this time?

A:

He said to me
Bob home that
you mean. He
the yellow—I

Q:

I am talking did he say anything
generally about anything that he liked to
do with baseball bats?

A:

He said he would like to bash his head
in.

Q:

This particular head?

A:

He said he would beat his head

you are lucky that you took
night. And I said what do
said you are lucky to run
can't say it.

....

Referring to this testimony, defendant contends that
"such evidence tended to show the defendant had the propensity to
commit other wrongs or crimes and was grossly prejudicial.

Such

evidence, as a matter of law, did not show a common scheme or
plan" (Defendant's Brief at 15). On the contrary, purpose of the
elicited testimony was not to convince the jury that defendant
had assaulted Mrs, Donaldson or had previously attempted to
assault Mrs. Donaldson or had previously attempted to assault
another bartender.

Rather, this evidence shows defendant's state

of mind shortly preceding the attack on the victim in this case;
his aggressive behavior and pattern of picking fights throughout
the day and evening preceding his confrontation with the victim
(which, ironically, occurred when the victim attempted to
intervene in another altercation initiated by defendant (R.
261)); and his use of a club-like instrument in an offensive
manner.

The evidence directly supports the State's position

that contrary to defendant's initial claim of self-defense, he
entertained the intent to initiate a fight and to use the pool
stick as an offensive weapon, and the knowledge that in using the
weapon on the victim he would cause death.

Each of these facts

go directly to the element material for a conviction of second
degree murder.
Defendant suggests that "during the trial, the jury was
presented a picture of Stanley Gotschall as a cantankerous man
who had made repeated threats to various people that he would hit
them with his "'attitude adjustor,' a baseball bat" (Defendant's
Brief at 16). This allegation suggests that the State paraded

before the jury a lengthy account of various occurrences over a
general extended period of time. Admittedly, such a composition
of experiences might do little more than disgrace defendant and
show some criminal propensity.
is improper.

This limited use of such evidence

State v. Wells# 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979).

However,

the evidence in this case is much more than a compilation of
unrelated bad acts.

The incidents related by Donaldson and

Hadden were not simply examples of misconduct given to sully the
character of defendant.

They were specific acts which occurred

within twelve hours before the victim's death which suggest that
defendant's actions were intentional, motivated by anger and done
with knowledge of the result.

Under Rule 404(b) of the Utah

Rules of Evidence, evidence of such acts is properly admissible
as an exception to the general inadmissibility of character
evidence.

As such, the questioned evidence did not unfairly

prejudice defendant and no error was committed.
POINT III
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO CITE TO THE RECORD
ON APPEAL TO SUPPORT THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
UPON WHICH HE BASES HIS LEGAL ARGUMENTS, AND
A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AMBIGUOUSLY REFERRED
TO BY DEFENDANT DOES NOT SUPPORT HIS
ARGUMENT, DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
Defendant alleges that the State introduced evidence of
the character of the victim in violation of Rule 404(a) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence because defendant had not opened the door
for such evidence (Defendant's Brief at 20-21).

However,

defendant cites to the record at 158 as the sole support for his
allegation.

This single page reference is to the beginning of a

conversation between counsel and the Court in chambers about
admitting character evidence.

At this point, defendant did not

object to the evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness
(R. 158-61).

The conversation countered around whether the state

could put the evidence in before putting on defendant's statement
that he hit Mr. Miller in self-defense.

The situation was

resolved when the state agreed to offer the defendant's statement
claiming self-defense before offering the proposed character
evidence and defense counsel agreed that this would be
appropriate (R. 160-61).

No further references to either the

trial transcript or the record are made by defendant and it is
not clear to what specific testimony defendant now objects.

See

State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This court cannot
rule on matters outside the trial court record).

Under these

circumstances, the Court should assume the correctness of the
trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's conviction.

Utah

R. App. P. 24 (1985); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah
1983) (correctness of the trial court's judgment is assumed when
counsel on appeal fails to comply with Utah R. Civ. P.
75(p)(2)(2)(d) (1977)—the rule that preceeded Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) (1985));
1982).

State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah

In that "[t]he burden of showing error is on the party

who 6eeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263,
1267 (Utah 1982), the State should not be put to the task of
developing defendant's legal arguments by searching through the
record and making reference thereto to support defendant's
factual allegations.

The obligation to direct the Court to
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pertinent parts of the record falls upon defendant, not the
State.

Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals

succinctly provides:
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of the
appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order here indicated:
•

• • •

(9) An argument. The argument shall
contain the contentions of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented and the
reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on.
However, in an effort to avoid the necessity of
supplemental briefing, the statement made by defendant to the
police concerning self-defense was the basis for admission of any
character evidence regarding the victim's peaceful nature and any
character evidence was, therefore, not a violation of Rule
404(a).

Officer Scott Sandberg, to whom defendant made the

statement concerning self-defense, was called twice by the State
and twice by defendant.

Initially, the State questioned Sandberg

in order to identify a photostatic copy of defendant's statement
which was admitted, without objection, as State's Exhibit 11 (R.
246).

The State later recalled Officer Sandberg to admit

additional exhibits (R. 414). No questions were asked on either
of these occasions as to the specific substance of defendant's
statement to the police or the character of the victim.
The substance of defendant's statement was revealed
later in the trial when the defense called Officer Sandberg to
testify (R. 482). Using State's Exhibit 11, defendant asked
Officer Sandberg to read aloud the statement which was made by

defendant approximately two hours after the victim's death.

In

saying that this statement was improperly used at trial by the
State in its case in chief, and only used by defendant in forced
rebuttal, defendant has misrepresented the facts,
Defendant's Brief at 21.)

(See

Defendant agreed that the statement

would come in during the in-chambers discussion referred to above
(R. 161).
Barring further factual support or specific reference
to the trial transcript or the record, defendant has not met his
burden in presenting his allegation of the State's violation of
Utah R. Evid. 404(a).

Furthermore, an investigation of Officer

Sandberg's testimony concerning the questioned statement shows no
violation by the State and no prejudice to defendant.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), this Court
established precise standards for determining the applicability
of a proposed lesser included offense in the jury instructions.
First, the trial court must "determine whether an offense is
established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged."
State v. Valarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986).

If "the

evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative
explanations, the trial court must give the lesser included
offense instruction if any one of the alternative interpretations
provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the

defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense."

^d.

The State admits that there are circumstances in which
negligent homicide may appropriately be considered as a lesser
included offense of second degree murder.
at 453.

See State v. Velarde,

Therefore, the State does not argue with defendant

concerning the first point of the Baker test.

However, the State

strongly disagrees with defendant's assertion that the second
prong of the Baker analysis is also met in the instant case.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1) (1978) defines Negligent
Homicide as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
"Criminal Negligence" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4)
(1978):
A person engages in conduct:
(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
In viewing the evidence most favorable to the
defendant, the facts in this case do not lend themselves to a
conviction of negligent homicide.
testimony.
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Defendant stated during his

I hit him in the head. And I think I hit him
again. When he went down, I started to kick
him in the head, because I didn't know he was
hurt. And I was—it has always been my
policy when you have got somebody, you know
that you are in an altercation with, if you
can put them out—I say put them out of
business.
(R. 526). This statement demonstrates that defendant was not
only cognizant of the probable effects of his actions, but,
indeed, he desired to put the victim "out of business."

The

trial judge properly determined that there was no alternative
interpretation that would permit the jury to acquit defendant of
second degree murder and convict him of negligent homicide and
thus properly refused to so instruct.
Additionally, the fact that the jury did not choose to
acquit defendant of second degree murder and convict him of the
lesser included offense of manslaughter (an offense intermediate
in level between second degree murder and negligent homicide)
supports a conclusion that the absence of an instruction for
negligent homicide did not prejudice defendant.

The fact that

the jury did not choose the lesser offense that was offered
logically infers that the denial of an even lower level offense
was, at most, non-prejudicial error, and the decision of the
trial judge should be upheld.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the decision of the
trial court and uphold the conviction of second degree murder.
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1988.
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